Technical Note | Brazil and Proposals for Nuclear Armament in the 2026 Elections
In this Technical Note
Introduction
In October 2026, Brazil will hold General Elections for the positions of President and Vice President of the Republic; Governor and Vice Governor; Senator; Federal and State Deputy, or District Deputy in the case of the Federal District. The electoral period constitutes an important moment for public debate on the policies that may guide the actions of the Brazilian State over the following four years, encompassing issues of national and international relevance, such as health, education, infrastructure, foreign relations and, as the central theme of this Technical Note, security.
In this context, proposals in favor of the development of nuclear weapons by the Brazilian State, as well as the denunciation (withdrawal) from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), have gained space in the electoral debate. Such proposals raise serious concerns within Brazilian society regarding the conduct of public policy discussions on disarmament, security and nuclear non-proliferation.
Historically, Brazil’s commitment to the promotion of peace was consolidated by the 1988 Federal Constitution within the framework governing Brazil’s international relations, by establishing the defense of peace (Article 4, VI) as a constitutional principle, alongside the efforts of Brazilian diplomacy to shape a peaceful region, with particular emphasis on its exemplary role in initiatives such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which was fundamental in establishing Latin America as a nuclear-weapon-free region.
In light of this scenario, Dhesarme – Brazilian Action for Humanitarian Disarmament, as a non-governmental, non-profit and non-partisan civil society organization dedicated to promoting and strengthening Humanitarian Disarmament as a central framework for the protection of human security and statutorily guided by the consolidation of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) in Brazil, presents this Technical Note with the objective of contributing to the qualification of public debate on proposals for the nuclear armament of the Brazilian State.
This Technical Note therefore seeks to clarify conceptions related to the alleged possibility of guaranteeing peace through strategies such as nuclear deterrence; to present the humanitarian impacts associated with nuclear weapons, from the conduct of their tests to their use, highlighting the irreversible environmental and social consequences associated with both practices; and to analyze the relationship between the high military expenditures globally allocated to the production and maintenance of these weapons and the availability of public resources for the protection and well-being of civilian populations, particularly in addressing violations of fundamental rights, such as hunger, and promoting access to health, education and infrastructure.
1. Brazil and Its Historical Commitment to Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Brazil occupies a solid position within the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, built over more than five decades through successive constitutional, bilateral, regional and multilateral commitments. Following redemocratization, the Brazilian State reoriented its nuclear policy toward transparency and international cooperation, a process established by the 1988 Constitution and subsequent accessions to international verification and disarmament instruments.
Article 21, item XXIII, paragraph “a”, of the 1988 Federal Constitution grants the Union a state monopoly over the research, mining, enrichment, reprocessing, industrialization and trade of nuclear ores and their derivatives, and establishes that all nuclear activities within the national territory shall only be permitted for peaceful purposes and upon approval by the National Congress. The provision therefore prohibits both private exploitation of the sector and the application of nuclear technology for the development of weapons.
The provision was incorporated by the 1987–88 Constituent Assembly in the context immediately following the end of Brazil’s military regime (1964–85), a period during which the Brazilian State conducted a parallel nuclear program outside the control mechanisms in force at the time, without a declared conclusion regarding military purposes. The constitutionalization of the prohibition on the military use of nuclear energy is associated with the reorientation of Brazilian nuclear policy toward parameters of transparency.
It should be noted that, despite the aforementioned parallel nuclear program, still during the military regime, in 1967, Brazil became a party to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), which established the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a densely populated region of the planet. The treaty prohibits the manufacture, receipt, storage, installation, positioning and any form of possession of nuclear weapons by States Parties within the region covered by the treaty.
On July 18, 1991, Brazil and Argentina signed the Agreement for the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy, under which the two countries jointly renounced the development, possession and use of nuclear weapons. The agreement created the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), responsible for administering a Common System for Accounting and Control (SCCC) of nuclear materials, with reciprocal inspections between the two countries. In December 1991, this bilateral arrangement was complemented by the Quadripartite Agreement between Brazil, Argentina, ABACC and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which established comprehensive safeguards over nuclear materials and facilities in both countries, with inspections jointly conducted by ABACC and the IAEA. Since December 1991, the Brazilian Nuclear Program has been subject to these rules.
Since 1998, Brazil has been a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), whose central purposes are to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, promote general and complete nuclear disarmament, and foster international cooperation for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. On May 11, 1995, the treaty was extended indefinitely, and it currently has virtually universal adherence among UN Member States.
Brazil signed the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), adopted by the UN General Assembly on July 7, 2017, on the date it opened for signature, September 20, 2017. The country actively participated in the negotiations that preceded the treaty. The signature was not followed by ratification, and therefore the treaty remains without full legal effect for the Brazilian State. Under Article 2 of the TPNW, Brazil and Argentina fall among the States that already have a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA.
This body of law demonstrates that Brazil’s commitment to nuclear non-proliferation derives from a consistent legal framework composed of different instruments developed over decades. The Brazilian State has consolidated a trajectory of continuous compliance with international nuclear non-proliferation standards.
2. The 2026 Elections and Proposals to Develop and Arm the Brazilian State with Nuclear Weapons
Although the debate surrounding a potential Brazilian military nuclear capability is not new, in recent years statements originating from the national political sphere have begun to more explicitly associate the possession of nuclear weapons with the country’s security, sovereignty and international projection. Since 2019, for example, the claim that the existence of nuclear arsenals would contribute to the preservation of world peace has appeared in public debate, based on the premise that States possessing such weapons would be protected by the possibility of retaliation.
The association between nuclear weapons and peace, however, rests on a fundamental contradiction. The logic of nuclear deterrence is based on the credible threat of using weapons capable of causing catastrophic humanitarian consequences. Its effectiveness also depends on the States involved acting rationally, having accurate information, and maintaining fully functional command, communication and warning systems. These assumptions, however, are subject to the limitations inherent in human decision-making and technical systems. In this regard, the existence of nuclear arsenals does not eliminate the risks of conflict, but introduces additional factors of instability, such as miscalculations, accidents, technical failures and escalation processes that may result in irreversible consequences.
More recently, the debate has moved beyond political statements concerning nuclear deterrence. In 2025, a proposal for an amendment to the Constitution related to the possibility of Brazil developing nuclear weapons was presented in the National Congress, a subject that was again publicly advocated in the context of the 2026 elections. A change of this nature would represent a significant rupture with the legal framework guiding Brazilian nuclear policy, particularly with the constitutional determination that all nuclear activities within the national territory shall only be permitted for peaceful purposes. It would also raise questions in light of the principles governing Brazil’s international relations, including the defense of peace.
Amending the Constitution, by itself, would also not eliminate the international commitments undertaken by the Brazilian State. Brazil’s non-proliferation policy is embedded in a broader legal architecture that includes, as previously mentioned, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), as well as regional mechanisms for verification and confidence-building. The development of a military nuclear capability would therefore require a profound review of domestic legislation and the international commitments undertaken by the country, with implications for the position historically maintained by Brazil in favor of nuclear non-proliferation.
In this context, the possibility of establishing the development of nuclear weapons as a long-term strategic objective for Brazil also began to be advocated during the 2026 electoral debate. The time horizon attributed to the proposal, however, does not eliminate its potential effects on regional security. A decision to pursue a military nuclear capability could alter neighboring countries’ perceptions of Brazil’s strategic intentions and place under strain a regional security architecture built, among other elements, upon the commitment to keep Latin America and the Caribbean free of nuclear weapons.
This impact would be particularly relevant in the Southern Cone, where Brazil and Argentina have built, over decades, mechanisms of cooperation, transparency and reciprocal verification that have made it possible to overcome longstanding mistrust in the nuclear field. A potential Brazilian decision to develop nuclear weapons could weaken these advances, affect the trust built between the two countries, and alter a trajectory marked by cooperation in favor of a dynamic of greater strategic competition.
The experience of other States further demonstrates that nuclearization should not automatically be equated with development or greater security. The Indian experience, for example, shows that acquiring a military nuclear capability entails significant economic and opportunity costs that have not prevented the deepening of strategic competition with Pakistan. In South America, a similar dynamic could potentially undermine a regional environment in which nuclear cooperation and the absence of atomic arsenals constitute important elements of stability.
Furthermore, the potential implementation of such a program and the changes required in Brazil’s legal and diplomatic positioning could entail significant costs for the country, including restrictions on scientific and technological cooperation, loss of international trust and credibility, and the adoption of restrictive measures, including economic ones. The debate over the development of nuclear weapons by Brazil therefore goes beyond the strictly military or technological dimension. Its possible effects extend to the legal commitments undertaken by the Brazilian State, the relationships established with countries in the region, its international standing, and regional security conditions. In this regard, proposals of this nature require a broad analysis of their legal, diplomatic, economic, strategic and humanitarian implications.
3. Nuclear Weapons: Humanitarian Impacts, Military Expenditures and Brazil
The development of nuclear weapons by Brazil would not necessarily entail the conduct of nuclear tests. This possibility, however, cannot be disregarded. From a strategic perspective, a potential test could serve a dual function: technical, by allowing the yield and reliability of the device to be assessed; and political, by demonstrating technological, scientific and industrial capabilities. Such a demonstration, however, could produce significant and lasting humanitarian and environmental consequences resulting from exposure to radiation and the contamination of populations, territories and ecosystems.
In this regard, it is important to consider the historical experience of the more than 2,000 nuclear tests conducted since 1945, including atmospheric, underground and underwater tests. Many of these tests were conducted in colonized or peripheral territories and had particularly severe effects on Indigenous peoples and local communities, which remained exposed to the human, health and environmental consequences of these activities. The United States, France and the United Kingdom, for example, conducted tests in the Marshall Islands, French Polynesia and desert areas of Australia. The unequal distribution of these risks and impacts, associated with the power relations that determined the choice of testing sites, and based on the premise of pursuing “development,” has been characterized by various experts as “nuclear colonialism.”
From this perspective, the strategic logic inherent in nuclear testing, based on transforming certain territories and populations into true sacrifice zones, contrasts with Brazil’s diplomatic discourse of pursuing peace and, particularly in this case, the self-determination of peoples (principles established in Article 4 of the 1988 Federal Constitution) and criticism of power structures inherited from colonialism. Beyond testing, the very use of these weapons, as demonstrated by the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, illustrates the scale of their humanitarian consequences, compounded by the permanent risk of intentional or accidental use.
In addition to the possible conduct of nuclear tests, it is essential to consider the costs associated with developing a Brazilian nuclear arsenal. In addition to initial investments in research, infrastructure and technological development, maintaining a military nuclear capability would require continuous resources for security, maintenance, modernization and eventual replacement of arsenals. According to ICAN, the nine nuclear-armed States spent approximately US$119 billion on nuclear weapons in 2025. Even relatively lower expenditures, such as those of North Korea, amounted to more than US$650 million, resources that could be directed toward areas such as health, education, infrastructure and addressing climate change.
In the Brazilian case, this issue acquires particular relevance in light of existing demands for investment in essential areas such as health, education, infrastructure and addressing climate change. The potential adoption of a nuclear weapons program would therefore constitute a long-term decision concerning the allocation of public resources and the State’s strategic priorities. The debate thus goes beyond the question of Brazil’s technical capacity to develop a nuclear weapon and reaches a broader choice regarding which policies, priorities and development projects the country intends to finance.
Conclusion
Based on the elements analyzed in this Technical Note, it can be observed that proposals for Brazil to develop nuclear weapons present significant incompatibilities with the legal, diplomatic and strategic framework that has historically guided Brazilian nuclear policy. At the domestic level, an initiative of this nature would conflict with the 1988 Federal Constitution, which establishes the use of nuclear activities exclusively for peaceful purposes and enshrines, among the principles governing the country’s international relations, the defense of peace and the self-determination of peoples. At the international level, it would represent a profound change in relation to the trajectory built by Brazil regarding nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and to the commitments undertaken through the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the verification mechanisms established within the framework of ABACC.
A potential Brazilian decision to develop nuclear weapons would also have implications for regional security. The status of Latin America and the Caribbean as a nuclear-weapon-free region is the result of decades of cooperation, while Brazil and Argentina have built mechanisms of transparency, verification and mutual confidence that have contributed to overcoming longstanding mistrust in the nuclear field. A change in Brazilian policy could weaken these advances, alter neighboring countries’ perceptions of Brazil’s strategic intentions, and introduce new tensions into a region whose experience demonstrates the possibility of building security through cooperation and non-proliferation.
The debate goes beyond Brazil’s technological capacity to develop a nuclear weapon. It concerns a choice with legal, diplomatic, economic, strategic, environmental and humanitarian implications. The historical consequences of the use and testing of these weapons, as well as the costs associated with their maintenance, demonstrate the need to consider their effects on civilian populations, the environment and the allocation of public resources. In this regard, the proposals presented in the political and electoral context of 2025 and 2026 should be considered in light of Brazil’s trajectory of non-proliferation and disarmament, the international commitments undertaken by the country, and the possible effects of a change of this magnitude on the security of Brazil and the region.
Dhesarme – Brazilian Action for Humanitarian Disarmament
Foz do Iguaçu, September 8, 2026
References
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