Debunking 4 Myths About Brazil's Non-Accession to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Collected remnants of Russian cluster munition rockets that were used to attack the city of Kharkiv, at a storage area in Kharkiv, Ukraine, December 22, 2022. © 2022 Evgeniy Maloletka / AP

Recognized and internationally condemned for their indiscriminate nature and their contribution to the spread and prolongation of humanitarian crises around the world, cluster munitions are weapons currently prohibited under the Convention on Cluster Munitions. The treaty forms part of the body of International Humanitarian Law and prohibits the use, transfer, production, and stockpiling of these weapons.

Adopted in 2008 and entering into force in 2010, the Convention represents a landmark in the protection of Human Rights by addressing the effects of these munitions on civilian populations. Cluster munitions are notorious for contaminating territories transformed into "minefields" for years — and even decades — after armed conflicts. They also cause profound environmental damage due to the mechanical components of the weapons, as well as the death or physical incapacitation of civilians as a result of the high failure rates of these weapons in use.

In contrast to the more than one hundred States Parties to the Convention, committed to ending the unnecessary human suffering caused by the use of these weapons and acting in accordance with the safeguards established by International Humanitarian Law since the Geneva Conventions, Brazil remains detached from the discussions surrounding this agreement, which is essential to the protection of civilian lives and the preservation of a Culture of Peace that has historically been one of the hallmarks of Brazilian diplomacy.

Submunition of an ASTROS II cluster munition rocket, manufactured by Avibrás Indústria Aeroespacial SA., found in Saada City, Yemen. © 2016 Private

Given this regrettable position, it is necessary to analyze and understand the reasons that lead the Brazilian State to continue its non-accession to the Convention on Cluster Munitions while producing weapons that have contributed to worsening humanitarian crises around the world, bearing the "Made in Brazil" label on their bombs. This is exemplified by the Brazilian cluster munitions used by Saudi Arabia against Yemen between 2015 and 2017, incidents reported by the world's leading humanitarian news outlets due to concerns over the exposure and victimization of civilians in affected areas.

Learn more about Brazil's production of cluster munitions.

With this objective, this article seeks to debunk the four main myths that Brazil has presented over the years to justify its non-accession to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the maintenance of its position as a recognized producer of these weapons.

1. Cluster munitions are "deterrent" weapons for the defense of Brazilian territory

When defended by Brazil's national defense authorities, the most common argument used to justify the production of cluster munitions on Brazilian territory is that such bombs provide a deterrent advantage to Brazil's borders and, consequently, to national sovereignty. However, this argument is unfounded, as these are obsolete weapons dating back to the Cold War, internationally condemned for their high failure rates resulting from climatic and geographical variations when deployed, causing them to perform very differently from the ideal conditions observed during manufacturers' tests. The concept of "deterrence" is based on the assumption that the possession or use of a particular weapon or military capability discourages potential adversaries from attacking the State that possesses it, ensuring national security through weapons that, if used in defense of its territory, would deny the enemy any meaningful advantage and thereby reduce the likelihood of attack.

In this context, cluster munitions certainly do not provide effective deterrence for Brazil's artillery, since, in the event of armed conflict, they do not constitute a genuine deterrent against adversary States equipped with advanced military technologies. On the contrary, cluster munitions are unlikely to satisfy the principle of proportionality, as any concrete and direct military advantage that may result from their use is outweighed by the severe humanitarian harm they cause. It therefore follows that their use cannot justify, under International Humanitarian Law, the human costs imposed on civilian populations, violating not only the principle of proportionality but also the principle of military necessity.

2. Brazil's non-accession to the Convention on Cluster Munitions is due to the fact that its negotiation took place outside the framework of the United Nations

Brazil is a signatory to and exemplary member of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty, a treaty developed through Canadian leadership (which is why it is also known as the Ottawa Treaty) in collaboration with civil society organizations and humanitarian committees. In other words, it is a treaty negotiated outside the framework of the United Nations, a fact that did not prevent Brazil from playing a widely recognized role in combating anti-personnel landmines and their inhumane characteristics and consequences for civilian populations.

On the other hand, the country has inconsistently used this argument as a means of continuing to produce a weapon with consequences very similar to those of landmines, since cluster munitions are bombs that, when they fail to explode, become de facto dormant landmines, contaminating vast areas and causing the forced displacement of entire civilian communities due to their short- and long-term consequences for the implementation of International Humanitarian Law.

3. The prohibition of cluster munitions should be addressed within the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons

Brazil considers Protocol V to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons on Explosive Remnants of War to be sufficient for the regulation of these weapons. However, the Protocol addresses the issue only in a general manner, establishing positive obligations concerning the responsibility of parties to armed conflicts with regard to explosive remnants, the clearance and control of contaminated territories, and the sharing of information about such weapons, while, conversely, imposing no prohibitions on their use or export. This is due to the difficulty of advancing humanitarian initiatives within a body that requires absolute consensus among States, as is the case with the CCW.

In this regard, the Convention on Cluster Munitions aims to move beyond this approach by establishing genuine prohibitions on the use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of cluster munitions, recognizing that they are inherently indiscriminate weapons. Furthermore, a "Protocol VI" was once proposed by Norway to regulate cluster munitions specifically within the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. However, this initiative was never adopted, with the result that States not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, such as Brazil, continue to lack any specific legal framework aimed at ending the suffering caused by these weapons.

4. Articles 2 and 21 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions as provisions that "privilege" certain States

The Convention defines, in Article 2, a series of specifications that characterize the indiscriminate nature of cluster munitions, addressing victims, unexploded submunitions, contaminated areas, and other related issues. However, it is paragraph 2 of this Article that gives rise to one of the arguments apparently invoked to reject the treaty. In defining cluster munitions, the text also specifies what does not constitute such a weapon, creating suspicion and leading some to interpret the provision as discriminatory, allegedly designed to disadvantage certain States that manufacture weapons with those specifications while benefiting others. However, it should be emphasized that the purpose of this Article is precisely to establish the criteria that make a weapon indiscriminate, including its technical specifications. Ultimately, the paragraph seeks to prevent the future production of weapons capable of causing harm similar to that caused by cluster munitions.

Article 2 Definitions For the purposes of this Convention: [...] 2. “Cluster munition” means a conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes those explosive submunitions. It does not mean the following: (a) A munition or submunition designed to dispense flares, smoke, pyrotechnics or chaff; or a munition designed exclusively for an air defence role; (b) A munition or submunition designed to produce electrical or electronic effects; (c) A munition that, in order to avoid indiscriminate area effects and the risks posed by unexploded submunitions, has all of the following characteristics: (i) Each munition contains fewer than ten explosive submunitions; (ii) Each explosive submunition weighs more than four kilograms; (iii) Each explosive submunition is designed to detect and engage a single target object; (iv) Each explosive submunition is equipped with an electronic selfdestruction mechanism; (v) Each explosive submunition is equipped with an electronic selfdeactivating feature; (Convention on Cluster Munitions, 2008)

Along the same lines, another argument advanced by the Brazilian State for not acceding to the Convention is that paragraph 3 of Article 21 provides that, in cases of military alliances with non-signatory States, the use of cluster munitions would not be prohibited, thereby granting certain countries engaged in armed conflict an alleged "advantage." However, this interpretation is mistaken. Contrary to this understanding, the Article does not grant States Parties the right to use cluster munitions in armed conflicts whenever they maintain military alliances with States not party to the Convention. Rather, the provision establishes that cooperation with States that use cluster munitions is not, in itself, prohibited, while the prohibition on the use of these weapons by States Parties remains fully in force.

Article 21 Relations with States not party to this Convention 1. Each State Party shall encourage States not party to this Convention to ratify, accept, approve or accede to this Convention, with the goal of attracting the adherence of all States to this Convention. 2. Each State Party shall notify the governments of all States not party to this Convention, referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article, of its obligations under this Convention, shall promote the norms it establishes and shall make its best efforts to discourage States not party to this Convention from using cluster munitions. 3. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 of this Convention and in accordance with international law, States Parties, their military personnel or nationals, may engage in military cooperation and operations with States not party to this Convention that might engage in activities prohibited to a State Party. 4. Nothing in paragraph 3 of this Article shall authorise a State Party: (a) To develop, produce or otherwise acquire cluster munitions; (b) To itself stockpile or transfer cluster munitions; (c) To itself use cluster munitions; or (d) To expressly request the use of cluster munitions in cases where the choice of munitions used is within its exclusive control. (Convention on Cluster Munitions, 2008)

It is imperative that the Brazilian government reassess its position on the Convention on Cluster Munitions and recognize its indispensable role in the protection of Human Rights. Brazil's commitment to diplomacy for peace and to International Humanitarian Law must be reflected in its accession to instruments that, like this Convention, effectively safeguard human dignity.

Written by: Fernando Fiala

Reviewed by: Giovanna Rezende

20/07/2026 BRT

The views expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the institutional position of Dhesarme.

References

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL. Yemen: Brazilian cluster munitions suspected in Saudi Arabia-led coalition attack. October 30, 2015. Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2015/10/yemen-brazilian-cluster-munitions-suspected-in-saudi-arabia-led-coalition-attack/. Accessed: April 18, 2026.

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL. Yemen: Saudi Arabia-led coalition uses banned Brazilian cluster munitions on residential areas. March 9, 2017. Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2017/03/yemen-saudi-arabia-led-coalition-uses-banned-brazilian-cluster-munitions-on-residential-areas/. Accessed: April 18, 2026.

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH. Yemen: Brazil-made cluster munitions harm civilians. December 23, 2016. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/12/23/yemen-brazil-made-cluster-munitions-harm-civilians. Accessed: April 18, 2026.

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH. Yemen: Cluster munitions wound children. March 17, 2017. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/03/17/yemen-cluster-munitions-wound-children. Accessed: April 18, 2026.

VIEIRA, Gustavo; SITO, Santiago. O Tratado Banindo as Bombas Cluster e a Posição Brasileira: Para qualificar o debate nacional [The Treaty Banning Cluster Bombs and the Brazilian Position: Contributing to the National Debate]. Santa Maria: Centro Universitário Franciscano, 2010.